IGEM:Carnegie Mellon University/2009/Notebook/SUCCEED Survey and Peer Incentives/2014/02/11
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Smoking in Thailand paper, control vs treatment - treatment had incentives for both team members if they quit but nothing if only one person quit, the other had teams but no group incentives
Also went over two options for group incentives:
1) 3rd person: feasibility issues with how money will be distributed to third person
2) Trust: uncertainty over whether or not person will respond, cost-effectiveness.
Unconditional incentives could incentivize people to pass it on to their friends, since it's free money for your friends
Conditional group incentives people might not pass survey to friends if they don't know whether friends will even fill it out. Possibility of monitoring your friends would make conditional group incentive more effective
Any way to reconcile uncertainty in us giving participants money and participants' uncertainty in getting paid?