Synthetic Society/Biological Risks and Security
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We are currently trying to develop a strategy for organizing our work.
- Suggestion. If possible, focus only on the "delta" impact on biological risk & security due to synthetic biology, not the entire biological security and risk landscape. We need to evaluate whether or not this is possible?
- What are the intentional SB contributions to risk?
- What are the accidental SB contributions to risk?
- What are the active SB contributions to security?
- What are the passive SB contributions to security?
- Suggestion. Evaluate costs associated with using synthetic biology technologies relative to other already accessible approaches.
- Suggestion. What sorts of uncertainty frame our thinking?
- Suggestion. Develop bracketing use cases important examples that inform our discussions.
- For example, an agent that is trivial to obtain, but hard to weaponize.
- For example, an agent that is hard to obtain (today), but is itself already a weapon.
- Suggestion. Consider issues of speed, cost, diffusion, and luck.
- For example, how can we evaluate whether or not we can afford to use / ignore lists of top 100 agents?
- For example, can we come up with capabilities-based strategies?
- Todo.
- How should we make progress on these issues? I.e., how to do the research?
